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RESPONSE
THE IMMORTALITY OF EQUITABLE BALANCING
David Schoenbrod*

P

ROFESSOR Goldstein argues that courts should not weigh the bur-

den on defendants in deciding whether to enjoin statutory violations.
Such an undue hardship defense to a preventive injunction in statutory
cases would, he reasons, allow courts to upend the policy choice that the
legislature made in enacting the statute.1
Goldstein sees this practice as a threat to legislative policy choices,
because he views equitable discretion as giving judges open-ended discretion to reach whatever result makes sense to them. 2 He shares this
premise with Professors Abram Chayes and Zygmunt Plater; Chayes,
however, wanted courts to have broad discretion in formulating injunctions in public law cases while Plater, like Goldstein, seeks to deny discretion to allow violations to continue. 3 Plater wrote over a quarter century ago. Goldstein makes a valuable contribution not only by dealing
with subsequently decided cases, but also going back in time to challenge the Supreme Court's assumption that the courts have allowed an
undue hardship defense for many centuries.
* Trustee Professor, New York Law School; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Insti-

tute. For helpful comments on a draft. I am grateful to Professor David Levine, Professor
Tracy Thomas. and Melissa Witte. Esq.
1Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 Va. L. Rev. 486-90
(2010).
2 Id. at 517 27.
3 Compare Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv.
L.
Rev. 1281. 1292 94 (1976). with Zygmunt J.B. Plater. Statutory Violations and Equitable
Discretion, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 524, 527. 535. 590 92 (1982).
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I disagree with their premise that equitable balancing inevitably gives
judges open-ended discretion to reach whatever result makes sense to
them. In an article published in 1988, 1 argued that judges in common
law, constitutional, and statutory cases tend to honor the spirit of the rule
of liability even when they, after balancing the equities, allow a violation of the letter of the law to continue. Because what they are doing is
inadequately explained, however, I attempted to articulate a principle
that "makes explicit what is implicit in the case law":
The injunction should require the defendant to achieve the plaintiffs
rightful position unless (a) different relief is consistent with the goals
of the violated rule and (b) the case involves a factor justifying departure from the rule that was not reflected in its formulation, but the injunction may never aim to achieve more than the plaintiffs rightful
position.4
This principle seeks to explain decisions on whether to grant an injunction and also how to draft it.
Such equitable discretion, I argued, does no violence to legislative
policy choices. It honors those choices and operates instead on choices
that the legislature did not anticipate. It also honors the legislature's
goals. There is much that legislatures cannot anticipate, because statutes
apply in unexpected contexts, especially since they can stay in force for
decades. I was unaware in 1988 that the principle that I was describing
and my argument for it might be traced to Aristotle, who wrote that
[w]hen the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which
is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the
legislator fails us and has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission-to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been
present, and would have put into his law if he had known. Hence the
equitable is just .... 5

4 David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: a Principle to Replace Balancing
the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 627, 630, 664 (1988). My article

focuses on the permanent injunction. in writing it. I was helped by John Leubsdorf s article
on preliminary injunctions, which made the point that courts must honor the law of liability
in deciding whether to issue them. John Leubsdor; The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525. 549 50 (1978).
5 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, ch. 10 (W.D. Ross trans., Institute for Learning
Technologies 1995), available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.mb.txt.
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Contrary to Goldstein, the undue hardship defense should normally be
available in statutory cases. If the legislature nonetheless intends the statute to be enforced to the letter in all contexts, it can say so explicitly; if
not, the statute implicitly condones principled equitable discretion, because this principle is part of the background understanding against
which legislatures operate. 6 Dan Dobbs has dubbed the foregoing the
"Schoenbrod principle" (to the eternal gratification of my mother) and
conceives of it as a principle of statutory interpretation]
It is understandable that Goldstein sees the undue hardship defense as
authorizing courts to upend legislative policy choices. He reads a leading statutory injunction case, TVA v. Hill,8 to reject equitable balancing
for the reason that it would allow courts to nix legislative policy choices
and reads another, Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,9 to nix a particular
legislative policy choice. My 1988 article explains why I believe both
readings are wrong."
Goldstein also reads the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Winter v.
NaturalResources Defense Council to similarly upend a legislative policy choice." In Winter, environmental groups alleged that the Navy had
violated the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and other statutes by analyzing the impact of its use of sonar near California on
whales and other marine mammals through an "environmental assessment" rather than through a full-fledged "environmental impact statement." The groups sought and ultimately got from the district court and
the Ninth Circuit a preliminary injunction limiting sonar use for training
in certain areas. The Navy then prompted the President's Council on
Environmental Quality, the body that issues regulations under NEPA, to
promulgate a regulation purporting to create an emergency exception.
On this basis, the Navy moved the lower courts to lift the preliminary
injunction, but the courts doubted the claimed emergency exception. The
Supreme Court decided 5-4 that, even if plaintiffs were correct on the
merits and it were a permanent injunction case, equitable balancing
should have kept the lower courts from issuing the challenged portions
Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 657-58.
B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution § 2.10 (2d ed. 1993).
8437 U.S. 153 (1978).
6

7 Dan

9 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
10Compare Goldstein, supra note 1, at 508-512 (providing Goldstein's interpretation of
these two cases), with Schoenbrod. supra note 4. at 634 35. 648 52 (providing a contrary
interpretation).
11 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008); see Goldstein, supra note 1, at 486-87.
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of the12 injunction. This statement is the springboard for Goldstein's article.
Goldstein claims that, against the Navy's interest in training sailors,
the Court weighs not the potential harm to whales but rather the impact
on activities of members of the environmental groups in watching and
researching whales: "harm to the whales mattered only to the extent that
it harmed the plaintiffs, because the balance of equities takes into account injuries to the parties, not to the environment."13 The assertion that
the majority thus trivializes the goals of Congress does not square with
my reading of the opinion. While there is some language that could be
read that way in isolation, the opinion does discuss the factual disputes
in terms of the impact on the whales rather than just the impact on plaintiffs' scientific and recreational interests, and speaks of "plaintiffs' ecological, scientific, and recreational interests in marine mammals." 14 If
Goldstein were correct that the Court was trivializing Congress's purposes in this way, it would be a potent point. To it, I would add that dictum in the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Sierra Club v. Morton
suggests quite a different approach: "the fact of economic injury is what
gives a person standing to seek judicial review under the statute, but
once review is properly invoked, that person may argue the public interest in support of his claim that the agency has failed to comply with its
statutory mandate."1 5 It is in this mode, I think, that the majority opinion
in Winter, right or wrong, was written.
The result in Winter might be explained on any or all of three bases.
First, it may be, as Goldstein argues, that the majority disagrees with
Congress's policy judgment. Second, it may be that the district court did
a poor job of showing the basis for its decision in the record. This was
the conclusion of not only the five-justice majority opinion but also the
opinion by Justice Breyer joined by Justice Stevens, concurring in part
and dissenting in part: "several features of this case lead me to conclude
that the record, as now before us, lacks adequate support for [the contested portions of the] injunction."' 6 Third, it may be that the current
Court is confused about equitable balancing. Confusion is not surprising,
12 Goldstein.

supra note 1, at 487.
at 488-90, 514.
14 129 S. Ct. at 377-78, 378-80, 382 (emphasis added).
15405 U.S. 727. 737 (1972). This case is not cited in Winter. The Goldstein article cites
13 Id.

the case but not this passage or for this proposition.
16 129 S. Ct. at 383.
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because equitable balancing is applied in so many areas of substantive
law and takes into account such a variety of considerations that it cannot
be reduced to a list of discrete elements. Judges may well feel too
pressed by the demands of their docket to make order of a doctrine applied in so many disparate settings. In contrast, law professors do have
the time to do so and in that way can help the courts. This is a worthwhile endeavor, particularly when some judges contend that too little of
what law professors do is of practical value to the bench.
Goldstein might reply that it is better to kill equitable balancing than
criticize what he takes to be its misapplication, because result-oriented
jurists will disregard the correction. But, if misapplication of a doctrine
were reason enough to kill it, the law reports would be a killing field.
Even more important, jurists, whether result-oriented or not, are even
less likely to mind advice to kill equitable balancing than to correct it.
Professor Goldstein does not exempt from his death sentence equitable
balancing in drafting injunctions, 17 and it makes sense from his perspective that he does not. The drafting of injunctions, no less than the decision of whether to issue one at all, provides opportunity for unprincipled
judges to upend legislative policy choices. For example, suppose that a
polluter claims in good faith that it complies with regulatory requirements, but the court disagrees. A court on such facts is apt to tell the polluter to bring itself in compliance as soon as the court finds is practicable if the record shows that the pollution is doing no significant harm.
An unprincipled judge could give the polluter more time than really necessary.
Goldstein, I take it, would argue that all statutory violations should be
corrected immediately, even if that meant shutting down factories until
the necessary pollution control equipment is installed. But, there would
be no surer way of getting environmental statutes rolled back. Indeed,
when President Ronald Reagan's first Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") administrator called for enforcing a particular provision of the
Clean Air Act to the letter, the New York Times editorial board accused
her of trying to engineer a legislative revocation. And, consider the application of such a rule in cases finding that the EPA has not met statutory deadlines to issue regulations. Under Democratic and Republican ad-

17Indeed,

Winter itself could be conceived of as a decision on how to draft an injunction

as opposed to whether to grant one at all because the Navy sought certiorari on only two of
the six requirements of the district court's injunction.
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ministrations, the EPA misses large numbers of such deadlines. It would
upset other statutory priorities for a court to insist that the EPA devote
all its resources to promulgate the regulation at issue in a particular case
as soon as possible."8 Courts often grant more time in cases in which
polluters violate standards and in which agencies miss deadlines.' 9
Equitable balancing must also still play a role in deciding the degree
of prophylaxis in prophylactic injunctions and how completely a defendant must repair the ill effects of past violations.2" I am unsure whether
Goldstein would exempt these applications of equitable discretion from
his death sentence. He does say that he would bar equitable balancing in
preliminary injunction cases to enforce statutes. 2' Yet, some such balancing seems inevitable when part of the test includes probability of
success on the merits. This probability is used in considering the impact
on the plaintiff of being right on the merits and getting no preliminary
injunction and the impact on the defendant of being right on the merits
and being subject to a preliminary injunction.
The fuzziness of the distinction between the applications of equitable
discretion that Goldstein would bar and other applications is illustrated
by Hecht Co. v. Bowles.2 2 This 1944 Supreme Court decision undid a
lower court's injunction against a department store to stop violating wartime price control statutes. Goldstein writes that "the store had come into
compliance [with the statute]" and "[t]he lower courts had concluded
that an injunction was not necessary to ensure continued compliance...,,21 1 too once pigeon-holed the case as denying the injunction
because there would be no more violations. But, in teaching it over the
years, I began to realize that the Court must have expected future violations. It notes that the statute and the regulations under it are so complex, and the department store so large, that the store had previously
committed thousands of violations despite good faith efforts. As to future violations, what the Court actually says is this: "The District Court
concluded that the issuance of an injunction would have 'no effect by
way of insuring better compliance in the future' and would be 'unjust' to

'8 See Illinois v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1597 (D.D.C. 1979).
19Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 642-43.
20 Id. at 644, 685-90.
21See Goldstein, supra note 1. at 487 n.7.
22 321 U.S. 321 (1944).

23Goldstein, supra note 1, at 507.
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petitioner and not 'in the public interest."' 24 The suggestion is not that
the store would commit no more violations but rather that compliance
would not be improved by an injunction. The flat claim that an injunction would have "no effect" is plainly an overstatement; compliance
might well be improved if the court ordered periodic reports on compliance efforts and their success and the number of violations would be
reduced if the court enjoined future violations. After all, the threat of
contempt fines would prompt the store to throw even more resources at
compliance. The "unjust" language is, I suppose, a reference to the opprobrium that would fall on the Hecht Company, the leading department
store in the nation's capital, if it were enjoined not to price gouge during
a war in which many of the store's customers had relatives who were being killed or injured in action. The Court goes to great length to paint the
store as acting in good faith in order to save it from this injustice. Concern for such undue hardship-that seems like the fitting term to me-is
foreign to Goldstein's iron insistence that defendants be made to comply
with statutes.
If one conceives of Hecht as in part an undue hardship case, it cuts
strongly against Goldstein's conclusion. Justice Douglas, who wrote the
opinion, was fresh from his labors as a New Deal regulator. As such, he
would be expected to be deferential to congressional intent, especially in
empowering an agency to carry out the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942 during a real emergency, a war of doubtful outcome in which price
gouging was seen as a threat to national security. Yet, the opinion is a
paean for equitable discretion: "[t]he qualities of mercy and practicality
have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation
between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims."2 5 Justice Douglas also writes of "the requirements of equity practice with a background of several hundred years of
history" and concludes that courts should not read statutes to cut off
their equitable discretion unless the legislature says so unequivocally.26
So, unless one conceives of Hecht as being limited to cases where defendants will comply with statutes completely, it is a powerful reason to
suppose that subsequently enacted statutes have acquiesced to equitable
balancing. Of course, Goldstein does not read Hecht that way.

24 Hecht,

321 U.S. at 326.
Id. at 329-30.
26 Id.
21
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To the contrary, he sets out to "debunk the myth that equitable balancing is an ancient judicial practice. 27 He traces the supposed myth to
the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo.
His effort to debunk rests upon his contention that state nuisance cases
did not discuss undue hardship until the end of the I800s and federal statutory cases did not do so until 1982.28 Yet, even putting Hecht to the
side, federal statutory cases from the I970s did countenance equitable
balancing.2 9 I have not looked for earlier cases.
I am not convinced by his analysis of nuisance cases that common
law courts did not balance the equities early on. An undue hardship defense to an injunction in a nuisance case from many centuries ago would
be unlikely to succeed for the same reason as it would be unlikely to
succeed in an intentional trespass case. Principled balancing in cases of
intentional trespass should always come out in favor of issuing the injunction. To deny it would be contrary to the goal of the law of trespass,
which is to give every landowner absolute power to decide whether to
convey title, except in the case of a taking for a public purpose. The
neighbor who wants to encroach has the alternative of seeking to purchase title. In contrast, there are modern cases of buildings that are unintentional trespasses or violations of covenants or contracts, but which do
not do great harm to the plaintiff and would be very expensive for the
defendant to correct. In such cases, the courts sometimes deny an injunction and relegate the plaintiff to monetary damages."
A nuisance case may well have looked very much like an intentional
trespass case to a court in a tradition-bound society many centuries ago.
The boundaries of acceptable behavior back then would have been reasonably well defined by custom, and the person who wanted to deviate
from custom had the alternative of buying the right from the neighboring
landowner. Moreover, to the extent liability in nuisance is defined not
just by custom but also by a weighing of the harm to the plaintiff against
the burden on the defendant of avoiding the harm, the burden on defendant might have been adequately handled at the liability stage and so
there may have been no need to discuss it at the remedy stage.
The industrial revolution necessarily put at least some sorts of nuisance in a different light. New technologies would bring conflicts with
27Goldstein, supra note 1, at 546.

28Id. at 490 508, 546.
29Schoenbrod, supra note 4, at 642-43.
30 Id. at 669-70.
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customs. What behavior would be illegal thus became less well defined.
Because the impact from new industrial techniques would often be felt
not just by one neighbor but rather by many, it became more difficult to
buy rights in bilateral purchases. These changes made at least some
more recent nuisance cases look less like intentional trespass cases and
so, in terms of my principle, potential candidates for the success of an
undue hardship case. Goldstein points to another explanation, which
strikes me as both correct and not exclusive of mine: the growing power
and importance of large industrial enterprises brought on by the industrial revolution.
Goldstein does make an important point in noting that the Supreme
Court's sweeping pronouncement in Weinberger and, I would add, in
Hecht, that undue hardship is a centuries-old doctrine, comes without
adequate citation and deserves to be investigated. I would also add that
we should not always expect to find the balancing filed under the same
doctrinal rubrics and accomplished through the same devices that we
find it today. That investigation, the unlikely pair of Aristotle and Justice
Douglas suggest, will turn up some way to adjust the remedy for violations of flat rules to idiosyncratic situations. The equitable impulse must
be even stronger now than several millennia or even several decades ago
because statutes today are much longer, the subjects of regulation more
complicated, and life is changing more quickly. Indeed, all nine justices
in Winter support equitable balancing in statutory cases.3 Their differences are about how to do it.
If equitable balancing is officially killed, as Goldstein wants, the
equitable impulse would sometimes come out in less open ways such as
interpreting statutes to narrow rights, denying standing, or other rulings
prerequisite to securing injunctive relief. Although the equitable impulse
cannot be killed, it can be made to hide, and that is where it would be
most prone to misbehave.

'It is worth noting that principled equitable balancing is analogous to the doctrine found
in Chevron v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). Chevron gives agencies latitude in implementing statutes as to issues to which the legislature has not spoken.
Principled equitable balancing gives courts latitude in enforcing statutes as to issues to which
the legislature has not spoken. Equitable balancing may well not require the legislature to
speak quite so clearly as does the Chevron doctrine.

